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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant Darwin Kocherhans, the plaintiff in the underlying trial case,
("appellant") characterizes the issues on appeal as follows:
(1) "Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claims on the
basis that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he
did not appeal the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals and
instead filed in district court?" and
(2) "Did the trial court err in dismissing Appellant's claim for
'wrongful termination' on the basis that the City's employee manual did
not create an implied contract between the City and Appellant?"
See Appellant's Brief at 1.
Appellees Orem City (the "City") and Jeffrey W. Pedersen ("Mr. Pedersen")
(collectively "appellees") submit that the narrow manner in which appellant has framed
the issues before this Court ignores other grounds upon which the district court's
dismissal of appellant's claims may be affirmed. Accordingly, appellees more
completely restate the issues on appeal as follows:
ISSUE 1:

Based on the decision on the merits by the Orem City Employee

Appeal Board (the "Board"), are appellant's claims barred by the doctrine of res
judicata*?
ISSUE 2:

Did the district court correctly determine that appellant was not

exempt from the requirement in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 to appeal the Board's
1

decision to the Court of Appeals and, as a result, did the district court correctly conclude
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellant's claims based on his failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies?
ISSUE 3:

Has appellant waived his right to assert that he is exempt from the

requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106, based on the fact that he availed himself of
its protections?
ISSUE 4:

Does the Orem City Employee Manual (the "Manual") create

contractual obligations regarding the termination of appellant's employment with the
City, despite its express disclaimer to the contrary?
ISSUE 5:

Regardless, based on the record before the Court, did the City

comply with the Manual's provisions with respect to the termination of appellant's
employment?
ISSUE 6:

Based on appellant's failure to address in this appeal the dismissal of

his claims for: (1) tortious interference with current and prospective economic relations;
(2) defamation, slander and libel; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4)
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment; and (5) respondeat superior, is the district court's
dismissal of these claims final?

III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106
Section 3 of the Orem City Employee Manual

?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW,
In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 ("Section 1106"), appellant

appealed to the Board the determination made by his Department Director, Mr. Pedersen,
to uphold the termination of appellant's employment with the City. Subsequently, a fullblown hearing was held before the Board on December 11, 2008, wherein: (1) the City
had the burden of proof; (2) appellant was represented by counsel, offered exhibits, and
examined and cross-examined witnesses; and (3) appellant had a full opportunity to
confront the evidence against him. (R. at 230-34). After its deliberations, the Board took
a secret ballot and unanimously determined that the "Director's decision to terminate
[appellant] was neither arbitrary and capricious nor otherwise illegal," and that the
termination decision was supported by "substantial evidence." (R. at 231). In its
December 15, 2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("Findings and
Conclusions"), the Board also concluded as a matter of law that appellant's performance
presented "a serious violation of city policy in terms of incompetence, inefficiency,
neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the City and failure to meet expected
performance levels such that immediate termination was warranted." (R. at 231)
(emphasis added).
Despite the express provision in Section 1106 that any appeal of an employee
board's decision is to the Utah Court of Appeals, appellant initiated this lawsuit by filing
his Complaint with the district court on August 7, 2009. (R. at 209). In his Complaint,

1

appellant asserted seven causes of action, all stemming from appellant's termination. (R.
at 210-217). ]
On September 8, 2009, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R at 237-68). In this
motion, appellees argued pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over appellant's Complaint because: (1) the Board's decision barred
appellant's claims under the doctrine of res judicata; (2) appellant had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies pursuant to Section 1106; and (3) given the fact that appellant
was not exempted from Section 1106 based on the express language of the Manual,
appellant had no right to file a complaint in district court. (R at 253-57). In their motion
to dismiss, appellees also argued pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) that appellant had failed to
state a claim because: (1) an implied contract is precluded by the disclaimer in Section 3
of the Manual; (2) appellees complied with the Manual2 in any event; and (3) appellant's
claim for defamation, slander, and libel fails because, as the Board found, the statements
in the Notice of Intent to Terminate (the "Notice") were true, the statements were not
defamatory per se in any event, and were also privileged. (R at 244-53).3

1

In his Docketing Statement, appellant addressed only two of his seven causes of action,
specifically his claim for wrongful termination and his claim for defamation. See
Appellant's Docketing Statement at 2-4.
2

Significantly, the Manual was attached in its entirety to the Complaint and, therefore, is
part of the record before this Court. (R. at 5-217).
3

Appellees hereby incorporate herein the arguments set forth in both their supporting
memorandum to their motion to dismiss (R. at 236-68) and their reply memorandum, as
additional bases for upholding the district court's decision (R. at 304-21).
4

Appellant filed his opposing memorandum to appellees' motion to dismiss on
October 1, 2009. (R. at 274-300). On October 29, 2009, appellees filed their reply
memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, wherein they responded to
appellant's arguments. (R. at 304-21).
The district court heard oral arguments on March 30, 2010. (R. at 351). On April
21, 2010, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision granting appellees' motion to
dismiss. (R. at 334-51). In its decision, the district court rejected appellant's argument
that he was exempt from Section 1106 and, as a result, determined that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. (R. at 343-48). The court reasoned that there were no facts to
determine, only a "legal interpretation of the City's Manual" was required. (R. at 346).
The district court agreed with appellees that the Manual defines the Department Director,
Mr. Pedersen, as the "head of a department." (R. at 346). A Department Director,
according to the Manual, is an "Executive Management Employee," who, according to
the Manual is not afforded grievance and appeals rights. In contrast, "Management
Employees" do receive these procedural rights in compliance with Section 1106.
Whereas the Manual does define Mr. Pederson's job an executive position, appellant's
job is defined as a management position and, therefore, appellant is not exempted from
Section 1106.4 (R. at 345-46). Since appellant was subject to Section 1106, the district
court determined that appellant's entire Complaint should be dismissed based on the

4

The district court reasoned that an example of a deputy to a department head might
include the "Assistant City Manager," in light of the assisting role played by this position,
but only because the position of Assistant City Manager is also defined as an executive
position. (R. at 344).
S

doctrine of res judicata and appellant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (R. at
348).
As "alternative grounds for dismissal," the district court rejected appellant's
argument of the existence of an implied contract. (R. at 343). The district court relied on
the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997, 1003
(Utah 1991) and Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23,1 58, 232 P.3d 486, to interpret the
disclaimer, acknowledging the ruling in Johnson that "clear and conspicuous language"
precludes an implied contract, and the ruling in Cabaness that an implied contract may be
found where the disclaimer does not cover the issue in question. The district court,
however, noted that the disclaimer in the Manual is found at the beginning of Section 3,
which is the section that deals with the "Human Resources Policies and Procedures," and
is the section that "includes the City's procedure in termination and the appeal process
which may follow." (R. at 340-43).
Judgment dismissing the case was subsequently filed in favor of appellees on June
7, 2010, (R. at 353-54), and entered on July 9, 2010, and appellant timely filed his Notice
of Appeal on June 7, 2010. (R. at 357-58). On July 27, 2010, appellant filed his Rule 9
Docketing Statement, wherein he couches the issue on appeal in terms of the exhaustion
of administrative remedies and, with respect to Section 1106, appellant does not claim he
is exempted from the requirements of Section 1106 (which is the argument asserted in his
opening brief); rather, he asserts that any appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals under
Section 1106 is permissive, not mandatory. See Appellant's Docketing Statement at 2-4.

6

B.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts fails to marshal many significant facts that are

relevant to the issues before this Court. As a result, appellees set forth the following
additional, undisputed, and uncontroverted facts in context below with the facts offered
by appellant.
Appellant worked for the City for 28 years and, during the last two and a half
years of his employment, he served as the City Treasurer. (R. at 233). Appellant asserts
that he received "above-satisfactory performance reviews" up until "only five months
prior to his termination." See Appellant's Brief at 4. While this is generally true, there
are some performance problems noted in appellant's reviews (R. at 180-207), which
justified the district court's characterization that, "[fallowing his promotion . . . several
performance problems were documented by Pederson." (R. at 350).
On September 15, 2008, appellant received the Notice, which stated that appellant
"had a pattern of neglect of duty, frequent errors and a general inability to complete the
functions of [the] office." (R. at 175-78). At the hearing before the Board, on December
11, 2008, appellant was represented by counsel, offered witnesses and exhibits, had the
opportunity to cross examine witnesses, and had a full opportunity to confront the
evidence against him. (R. at 230-34).
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Board found that appellant incorrectly
transmitted payroll information to the City's bank, despite "several opportunities to avoid
the problem and then correct it once the wheels had been placed in motion," including
"warnings by the bank that the submitted payroll figure was identical to the previous pay
7

period," where "two identical payroll amounts back-to-back is virtually impossible." (R.
at 233). In addition, the Board found that "numerous employees were underpaid while
five were overpaid," that "several hours of time correcting the mistake" by a number of
City employees where required to "avert[] a crises," and that the error "caused significant
problems for a number of City employees and bank personnel who had to correct the
error." (R. at 233). The Board also found, that those who were underpaid could have
faced distress by bouncing checks and incurring the associated costs. (R. at 233).
The Board found that, on two distinct occasions, appellant made mistakes
regarding the amount of wire transfers that he initiated to a bond trust fund. (R. at 232).
On both occasions, appellant mistakenly wired an amount that was ten times the amount
that should have been wired. (R. at 232). As a result, each mistaken wire was off by an
amount that exceeded a half million dollars, and the total amount that was improperly
wired on these two occasions exceeded $1.2 million. (R. at 232). On both occasions, the
City had to go to the effort to have the funds returned and, on one occasion, it took over a
week for the City to get its money back. (R. at 232).
In his brief, appellant asserts that he "was never trained .. . with respect to some
of the alleged mistakes." See Appellant's Brief at 5. Submitting back-to-back identical
payroll information and making incorrect wire transfers of a magnitude of $1.2 million,
however, are not the type of mistakes that one makes based on a lack of training.5 These
5

With respect to the issue of training, the Board found that plaintiff "was trained in the
day-to-day tasks of the Treasurer's position." (R. at 231). Regardless, the mistakes in
question do not involve a lack of knowledge regarding the submission of payroll
information or the wiring of funds, they involve carelessness, a lack of attention to detail,
and obvious neglect.
8

mistakes are, as the Board itself found, "part of a larger pattern of inattention to detail,5'
which was documented over an extended period of time. (R. at 233).
Additional mistakes included the fact that appellant "repeatedly wired the wrong
amount for Roth IRAs to Hartford despite being reminded by members of the accounting
department." (R. at 232). In July of 2008, appellant "incorrectly entered the new water
bill base rate . . . necessitating the] issue of a refund to residential water users . . . . " (R.
at 232). On April 2, 2008, appellant made a bond payment that was two months' late.
The Board found that this error, which was ongoing at the time of appellant's last
supposed "above-satisfactory" performance review, exposed the City to a risk of "a
downgrading of its bond rating." (R. at 232).
Additionally, the Board found that appellant "failed to respond to voicemails and
emails in a timely fashion and he often failed to attend scheduled meetings with other
employees," which "undermined his position as well as made it difficult for other City
employees to do their jobs." (R. at 232). Significantly, the Board also found that
appellant did not "have the support and confidence of his co-workers and supervisor,"
who "expressed that he is not competent to fulfill the duties required of the City
Treasurer." (R. at 232). The fact that people who worked with appellant on a day-to-day
basis, and who were closely acquainted with the facts relevant to appellant's performance
problems, testified as to appellant's lack of competence is not only telling, but important
because, as the Board found, the "City Treasurer must have . . . support to effectively
carry out his duties." (R. at 232).

9

In his Statement of Facts, appellant references certain portions of the "Disciplinary
Procedures" in the Manual, presumably to support his assertion that an implied contract
was breached. Appellant notes the distinction between informal and formal disciplinary
actions and then quotes Policy 2: "Disciplinary actions shall be limited in severity
commensurate with the infraction(s) in question and/or past infractions." Appellant's
Brief at 4-5 (emphasis added). Appellant then asserts that, prior to receiving the Notice,
appellant had "never been subject to any disciplinary notice or proceedings," and that
"the City took no efforts to correct any errors or address any performance concerns
through 'informal' action or discipline." Id.
Significantly, Appellant fails to disclose the provision from Policy 5 of the
"Disciplinary Procedures" in the Manual, that states, "[njothing contained in these
Policies and Procedures shall preclude dismissal with or without pay effective
immediately without prior notice and a hearing where the continued presence of the
employee would present a hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City."
(R. at 43) (emphasis added). Appellant also fails to disclose the Board's express
conclusion that appellant's "performance constitutes a serious violation of City policy in
terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the
City and failure to meet expected performance levels such that immediate termination
was warranted." (R. at 231). Based on this conclusion, as well as other findings made by
the Board, the City submits that it had the right to terminate appellant without prior
notice, pursuant to Policy 5 of the "Disciplinary Procedures" in the Manual. (R. at 43).
Moreover, while complaining that no informal actions were taken, appellant fails
10

to disclose the provision in Policy 3 from the "Disciplinary Procedures" section of the
Manual that states, "[i]t shall be the City's discretion as to which type of informal and/or
formal disciplinary actions is most appropriate." (R. at 44). Appellant also fails to
disclose the Board's finding that appellant "was on constructive notice that his job
performance was deficient due to his fellow employees numerous attempts to bring his
shortcomings to his attention." (R. at 231).
Additional important findings and conclusions made by the Board include the
finding that appellant "exhibited a lackadaisical attitude toward his duties as Treasurer
and lacks the necessary skill set to perform effectively in his role as City Treasurer" and
has "failed to perform his job with the standard of care required in such a sensitive
position." (R. at 231). As a matter of law, the Board concluded that the "Director's
decision to terminate [appellant] was neither arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal"
and that "there was substantial evidence . . . to support the Director's decision." Id.
In his Statement of Facts, appellant also ignored certain key provisions of the
Manual that support the district court's decision. For example, the Manual makes a
distinction between "Executive Management Employees" and "Management
Employees." (R. at 59). The Manual then states that Executive Management Employees,
which the Manual also refers to as Department Directors, "serve at the pleasure of the
City Manager . . . constitute the executive staff of the City and do not receive the
grievance and appeals rights provided in these policies and procedures." (R. at 59). Of
course these grievance and appeals rights are the ones mandated by Section 1106. By
contrast, the Manual's definition for Management Employees does not provide that these
11

employees serve at the pleasure of the City Manager, nor does it exempt them from the
Manual's grievance and appeal rights. (R. at 59). Significantly, the Manual classifies the
position of Treasury Division Manager (which is the position occupied by appellant) as a
"Management" position. (R. at 141). Thus, while "Executive" employees are "at-will"
employees, who serve at the pleasure of the City Manager and who are afforded no
appeal rights to the Board, "Management" employees, such as appellant, are afforded
appeal rights to the Board. These provisions establish that the City considered the
position of Treasury Division Manager to be a position that was covered by Section 1106.
V, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the first place, and regardless of any other arguments advanced by appellant, the
district court's decision should be upheld under the doctrine of res judicata. After a fullblown hearing before the Board, where appellant was represented by counsel and had the
right to present evidence, introduce exhibits, and examine and cross-examine witnesses,
the Board made findings and conclusions that are both binding on appellant, and fatal to
his claims herein. Similarly, pursuant to the "issue preclusion" prong of the res judicata
doctrine, the district court correctly held that the Board's decision bars appellant's other
claims, such as wrongful termination, breach of contract, defamation, tortious
interference with economic relations, and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
because each of these claims is premised on the assertion that appellant's termination was
somehow wrongful or inappropriate, or was the result of some improper conduct. To the
contrary, the Board's binding decision establishes that the termination was fully justified
and appropriate under the City's policies.
12

Second, the district court correctly determined that appellant was not exempt from
Section 1106 under the plain and express provisions of the Manual. The Manual
expressly provides that appellant, as the Treasury Division Manager, was not exempt
from the grievance and appeal rights afforded by the City in compliance with Section
1106. The Manual further establishes that appellant was not a "department head," which
under the Manual is an at-will position that is afforded no right of appeal to the Board.
The City does not have the position of a "deputy of a head of a municipal department."
In any event, appellant's own Complaint, as well as the Exhibits attached thereto,
conclusively establishes that appellant was a "Management" employee who was afforded
the right of appeal to the Board in the event of employment termination. Since appellant
is covered by Section 1106, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims at issue and appellant had no right to file the instant lawsuit. Rather, appellant
was limited to appealing the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals, which he
failed to do and, as a result, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Third, the City and appellant were both fully aware that appellant was covered by
Section 1106 as evidenced by the fact that appellant appealed his termination to the
Board. If the position of Treasury Division Manager was not covered by the appeal
rights set forth in Section 1106 (in other words if appellant was an at-will employee of
the City), he would not have been allowed to pursue his appeal to the Board. In any
event, having fully availed himself of the appeal provisions mandated by state statute and
the Manual, appellant has now waived his right to assert, after the fact, that he is exempt
from Section 1106.
13

Fourth, the district court correctly held that appellant failed to state a claim with
respect to his breach of contract and wrongful termination claims. Both of these claims
are barred by the fact that the Manual contains an express disclaimer to the effect that
nothing in its Human Resource policies (which are the very policies on which appellant
relies in asserting that the City wrongfully terminated him in violation of these
provisions) gives rise to any contractual rights. Under applicable law, and particularly in
light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cabaness, this disclaimer is fatal to the two
claims that are the focus of appellants' brief.
Fifth, regardless, based on the record before this Court, appellant has no claim that
the City violated its own internal policies when it terminated appellant's employment.
Appellant's argument that the City had to give him prior notice and an opportunity to
correct his performance deficiencies before terminating him is directly refuted by the
Manual itself. To the contrary, the Manual specifically provides that the City has the
right to terminate an employee without prior notice where the employee presents "a
hazard or disruption to employees, the public or the City." (R. at 215). Moreover, the
Board expressly found that appellant's poor performance and errors "harmed" the City
and its employees (R. at 233) and it concluded that his "serious violations of City policy
in terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, conduct causing discredit to the
City and failure to meet expected performance levels . . . [warranted] immediate
termination." (R. at 231).
Finally, on appeal, appellant has obviously abandoned his claims for defamation,
slander and libel, tortious interference with current and prospective economic relations,
14

negligent infliction of emotional distress, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment and
respondeat superior, because he has failed to address them in his brief, which focuses
solely on his claims for wrongful termination and breach of implied contract. Thus, the
district court's dismissal of these claims with prejudice is dispositive, and should be
upheld.

VI. ARGUMENT
A.

APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
RES JUDICATA.
The doctrine ofres judicata prevents parties from "relitigating issues" Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Appellant does not dispute that he appeared before the
Board, "was represented by counsel [and] offered witnesses and exhibits and had the
right to cross-examine the other party's witness." Appellant's Brief at 5. By availing
himself of a full evidentiary hearing before the Board, appellant took advantage of the
opportunity to litigate before the Board whether his termination was wrongful in some
way, or whether it was proper, appropriate and justified. Dissatisfied with the Board's
decision, appellant sought to litigate these same issues again before the district court.
This is the very problem that the doctrine ofres judicata is designed to prevent.
The doctrine of res judicata applies with equal force to administrative decisions,
such as the decision of the Board. "Although initially developed with respect to the
judgments of courts, the same basic policies, including the need for finality in
administrative decisions, support application of the doctrine of res judicata to
administrative agency determinations." Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States
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Tel & Tel Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (citing 4 Kenneth C. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 21:9, at 78 (2d ed.1983) and Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel
Co., 604 P.2d 4, 8-9 (Alaska 1979)).
The four requirements for applying this doctrine to the issues here are:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Murdoch v. Springville Man. Corp, 1999 UT 3 9 , \ 1 8 , 982 P.2d 65.
As discussed in detail below, each of these requirements is fully satisfied
here. Significantly, there is no argument regarding the first three requirements: (1)
appellant was a party to the proceeding before the Board; (2) the issues decided by
Board are the same issues raised in appellant's Complaint; and (3) appellant was
given a full evidentiary hearing, allowing the issues to be "completely, fully, and
fairly litigated" before the Board. Id. There is no dispute regarding these three
requirements because appellant did not address them and failed to raise any
objection regarding them in his brief and, therefore, he has apparently conceded
them. Appellant does assert, however, that "the fourth prong (final judgment on
the merits) was not met insofar as the Board's decision was subject to appeal to
the district court." Appellant's Brief at 13 (emphasis added). Appellant's position
on this issue is based on his argument that he was a "head of department" or a
"deputy of a head of department" and, therefore, is exempt from Section 1106's
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requirement that a Board's decision may only be appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals. Thus, by asserting a right of appeal to the district court, appellant seeks
to escape the doctrine of res judicata. As discussed below, however, the doctrine
ofres judicata applies here regardless of whether Section 1106 applies (which it
most certainly does) to appellant.
1.

Based On This Court's Recent Decision In Thorpe, The Doctrine Of
Res Judicata Clearly Applies If Appellant Is Covered By Section 1106.

Section 1106 requires that all appeals "shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board." When appellant failed to
appeal the Board's decision to this Court thirty days after it was issued, the Board's
judgment on the merits became final and, as a result, the fourth requirement of issue
preclusion under the res judicata doctrine was satisfied. This fact is established by this
Court's recent decision in Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 668 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4.
It is interesting to note that, when appellant filed his Docketing Statement in this
appeal, he did not assert that he was exempted from Section 1106; rather, in the
Statement of the Issues in his Docketing Statement, appellant asserted that Section 1106's
provision that "[a] final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court
of Appeals

is permissive in nature and does not act as a bar to Appellant bringing his

claims in district court." Appellant's Docketing Statement at 2-3. Between the filing of
his Docketing Statement and the filing of his brief, however, appellant's theory on this
issue was decided against him in Thorpe.
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Thorpe involved an appeal by a terminated municipal employee who, like
appellant, tried to appeal a board's decision upholding his termination to the district
court. Id, atfflf1-4. The district court in Thorpe dismissed the employee's case and held
that it lacked jurisdiction. Id. at ^ 6. This Court agreed, holding that the district court
lacked jurisdiction and it expressly rejected the argument that the language of Section
1106 is permissive. As a result, Thorpe stands for the proposition that an appeal to this
Court is an employee's exclusive remedy for challenging the decision of a Section 1106
appeal board. Id. atfflf22-25, % 30. Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is
controlling, this Court further held that "where the gravamen of the complaint is
termination of public employment by a merit employee .. . any judicial review must be
sought in the court of appeals." Id, at f 25. Like the employee in Thorpe, the gravamen
of appellant's Complaint is the termination of his public employment. Also, since the
employee in Thorpe, like appellant, did not file a timely appeal with this Court after the
decision by the appeal board {see id. at f 25), this Court refused to consider his claims
{see id. at ^ 30).
In the wake of the Thorpe decision, appellant was obliged to abandon the position
he claimed in his Docketing Statement and return to a position that proved unsuccessful
before the district court (R. at 343-47), namely, that Section 1106 does not apply to him.
Although this is an awkward and curious position for one who has already availed
himself of a full evidentiary hearing under Section 1106, it is the only position left to
appellant. As with his previous position, this second position is also unavailing even if
one were to assume, which appellees do not, that appellant is exempt from Section 1106.
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2.

Res Judicata Applies Even if Appellant Could Establish That He Was
Exempt From Section 1106.

Even if appellant were exempt from Section 1106, which appellees do not
concede, appellant's claims are still barred by the doctrine ofres judicata. It is
undisputed that appellant availed himself of a full evidentiary hearing before the Board.
The Board sat in deliberation regarding whether appellant's termination was appropriate
and, among other things, whether the City afforded him due process with respect to his
recognized property interest in his right to continued public employment, as recognized
by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In
short, the Board essentially has a statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction to ensure
that appellant is not deprived of his property interest in his right to continued public
employment without due process of law. Utah case law provides that a party is "free to
waive the requirement that a court must have personal jurisdiction over [him] before that
court can adjudicate a case involving" him. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson,
2000 UT 64, Tj 15, 8 P.3d 256. A party, however, submits himself to the jurisdiction of
"[a] court by appearance." Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (citing In McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917)).
The principal that a party may submit to jurisdiction by appearance is well established in
Utah, where the distinction between a special and a general appearance is maintained. A
special appearance is made "to contest a court's personal jurisdiction without submitting .
.. to it. [However], an appearance . . . for any purpose except to object to personal
jurisdiction constitutes a general appearance. In fact, by asking the court for any
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affirmative relief, a [party] thereby submits himself or herself to that court's jurisdiction."
Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P.2d465, 466-67 (UTApp 1991) (citations omitted).
Having made a general appearance before the Board, and having asked the Board
for affirmative relief, appellant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Board. The
Board rendered its judgment on the merits. (R. at 230-34). Appellant, therefore, is bound
with respect to the issues that were completely, fully, and fairly litigated before, and
decided by, the Board under the doctrine of res judicata insofar as the Board's judgment
on the merits is final.
As set forth above, appellant's sole objection to the fourth element of res judicata
{i.e., a final judgment on the merits) is based on the assertion that the Board's judgment
on the merits cannot be final because "the Board's decision was subject to appeal to the
district court." Appellant's Brief at 13 (emphasis added). Unfortunately for appellant,
his assertion must be weighed against controlling legal authorities, including the
Constitution of the State of Utah and recent precedent by this Court.
Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution states that "there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause."6 However, Section 5 also states that "[t]he district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5.
6

The Board is anticipated as a court of "original jurisdiction" in Section 1 of Article III,
which vests "judicial power" in the various courts of the State, including a "Supreme
Court,... a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and . . . such
other courts as the Legislature by statute may establish." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 1.
The Board is a statutorily established court of record, as established by the Legislature
pursuant to Section 1106.
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Appellant provides no statutory authority for the appellate jurisdiction of the district court
from the court of original jurisdiction, which in this case is the Board, because there is no
such statute. The only statute that addresses the appellate jurisdiction for decisions by the
Board is Section 1106(a), which provides that the Court of Appeals has sole appellate
jurisdiction. According to the Utah Constitution, therefore, the district court does not
have appellate jurisdiction over the Board. As noted above, this Court recently adopted
this line of reasoning in Thorpe, supra, 2010 UT App 297, ]fl[ 22-25. Therefore, when
appellant failed to appeal the Board's decision to this Court within the prescribed thirtyday period, the Board's judgment on the merits became final and the fourth prong of the
test for res judicata was satisfied. Accordingly, whether appellant is a department head
or a deputy to a department head is irrelevant for purposes of application of the doctrine
of res judicata. Moreover, appellees respectfully submit that application of this doctrine
requires this Court to affirm the district court's decision and it precludes appellant from
pursuing his claims before the district court.
3-

Res Judicata Covers All the Claims on Appeal.

In opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss, appellant asserted that res judicata
only applied to the claim of wrongful termination, not appellant's other claims. (R. at
291). However, the principal res judicata concern here is the "issues" that the Board
resolved, not the "claims." Res Judicata has two branches: (1) issue preclusion and (2)
claim preclusion. See Oman v. Davis Sck Disl, 2008 UT 70, H 28, 194 P.3d 956.
"[I]ssue preclusion corresponds to the facts and issues underlying causes of action. And
where two causes of action embody the same dispositive issue, a prior determination on
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that issue in the context of one cause of action can have a preclusive effect in later
litigation regarding the other cause of action." Id. at % 31. Thus, issues necessarily
decided by the Board can be dispositive of appellant's other claims.
The Board's judgment precludes the wrongful termination claim because the
issues decided by the Board, i.e., whether the termination was arbitrary, capricious,
proportionate, and supported by substantial evidence {see Orem City Code § 2-26-12),
establishes that appellant's termination was not wrongful. (R. at 230-34). The Board's
Findings and Conclusions also establish that the City did not breach any of its policies in
terminating appellant's employment. Indeed, the Board concluded that immediate
termination was warranted given appellant's serious violations of City policy. (R. at
231). Similarly, the other claims brought by appellant also have underlying issues
decided by the Board. (R. at 248, 251, 311, 314 and 317). However, appellant has
waived any argument as to these claims by not addressing them in his brief. See State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1232 (Utah 1993).7
4.

Precedent Establishes That The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Precludes
Administrative Boards And The District Court From Litigating The
Same Issues Twice.

7

As discussed above, appellant did reference his claim for defamation, slander and libel
in his Docketing Statement, but he has failed to address or discuss this claim in his brief.
Regardless, the defamation claim is precluded because, of course, truth is a defense to a
defamation claim, and the Board validated the Notice's statements regarding appellant,
and found them to be true. Specifically, the Board found that appellant had committed
serious financial errors, and concluded that appellant ignored warnings, was on
constructive notice, was not competent to fulfill his duties, and had lost the confidence of
co-workers and supervisors. (R. at 230-34). Moreover, the Board found there was
substantial evidence to support the charges made in the Notice. (R. at 231).
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Appellant essentially seeks to have the Board and the district court litigate the
same issues twice. The Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of res judicata to prevent
such an abuse in Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, 52 P.3d 1267. In
Collins, Sandy City claimed that the plaintiffs' use of their property violated its Land
Development Code. Id. at \ 3. The plaintiffs in that case, like appellant here, appealed
the order to an administrative board, the Sandy City Board of Adjustment (the "Sandy
City Board"), which upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the zoning ordinance. Id. at \
4. Then plaintiffs, like appellant, appealed the Sandy City Board's decision to the district
court, who also affirmed the decision. Id. The plaintiffs in Collins opted not to appeal
that decision. Id. In denying their subsequent lawsuit, the Utah Supreme Court held that:
the Collinses made a calculated choice to forego their appeals and that
the predicament in which they find themselves is of their own making.
They could have challenged the decision rendered . . . but elected not to
do so. They therefore forfeited their right to attack the decision on
direct appeal and now seek to collaterally attack that judgment.
However, we "cannot be expected, for [their] sole relief, to upset the
general and well established doctrine of res judicata, conceived in the
light of the maxim that the interest of the state requires that there be an
end to litigation-a maxim which comports with common sense as well
as public policy.
Id.
Here, appellant's claims are barred for the same reasons. Appellant had the
opportunity to appeal the Board's decision but elected not to do so. Thus, appellant
cannot now try to re-litigate claims that have previously been litigated to a complete and
final decision on the merits. Accordingly, appellant's claims are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.
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B.

AS A MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE, DEFENDANT IS SUBJECT TO THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1106.
Appellant's only response to appellees' lack of subject matter jurisdiction defense

is his contention that as "Treasury Division Manager" he was either a "head of a
municipal department" or a "deputy of a head of municipal department" and, therefore,
based on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, he was ineligible for any hearing under Section
10-3-1106. See Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant's argument, however, attempts to
bestow a title on himself that is not based in fact or reality.
To determine what position appellant held, and what his title was at the City, one
need look no further than appellant's own Complaint and the provisions of the Manual
itself. First, in his Complaint, appellant admits that in 2006 he was promoted from
Assistant Treasurer to Treasury Division Manager (City Treasurer). (R. at 216). In
addition, appellant identifies Mr. Pedersen as the "Department Director," as the
"Administrative Services Director," and as the "Director who by Procedure was to review
the decision to terminate Appellant." (R. at 215-16). In addition, the Manual also
defines a "Department Director" as "[t]he individual designated as the administrative
head of a department and designated as the Department Director for that department."
(R. 60). Further, appellant's May 2006-2008 Employee Evaluations are signed by Mr.
Pedersen as "Dept. Director," whereas appellant is identified as only "Treasury Div.
Manager." (R. 180-207); (R. 140-141). Thus, it cannot be disputed that appellant was a
"Division Manager" who reported to the department head, Mr. Pedersen, who was the
head of the City's Administrative Services Department.
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In his opening brief, appellant now argues that it is entirely possible that, as the
Treasury Division Manager, he was a "deputy" of the City Manager or Assistant City
Manager. See Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant, however, cannot cite to a single piece
of evidence in the record that supports this argument. The reason for this is obvious. It is
because there is none. In fact, the only relevant evidence in the record, the Manual,
establishes just the opposite. Appellant was a merit employee that was entitled to all the
protections of the Manual and the Utah Code in order to protect his property interest in
his public employment. Obviously, an "Executive Management Employee," such as Mr.
Pedersen, who pursuant to the Manual serves at the pleasure of the City Manager, is an
at-will employee who has no property interest in his job and, therefore, is not entitled to
the grievance and appeal procedures outlined in the Manual and mandated by Section
1106.8 (R.at59).
By contrast, "Management Employees," as defined by the Manual are not
exempted from the Manual's grievance and appeal policies and procedures.9 (R. at 59).
This is because "Management Employees" are merit employees who do have a property
interest in their public employment and, therefore, do have the right to appeal the
termination of their employment to the Board under the express provisions of the Manual.

8

Specifically, the Manual defines "Executive Management Employees" as, "Employees
in classifications designated as Executive Management who are Department Directors
and serve at the pleasure of the City Manager. These employees constitute the executive
staff of the City and do not receive the grievance and appeals rights provided in these
policies and procedures." (R. at 59).
9

The Manual defines "Management Employees" as "Employees of the City who are
filling management positions as determined by the City Manager." (R. at 59).
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Most importantly, the Manual expressly provides that the position held by appellant,
Treasury Division Manager, is a "Management" employee. (R. 140). These provisions
in the Manual establish that appellant is covered by Section 1106.
The Manual also expressly identifies those employees who have the right to file an
appeal to the Board, which, of course, appellant did in this case. (R. 39). "Only fulltime, part-time, and supplemental probationary employees (as defined by City policy)
shall have the right to appeal to the Board. Probationary employees, flexible employees,
trainee employees, and executive management employees (as defined by City policy) are
not eligible to appeal to the Board. (R. at 39). Of course, the appeal process to the Board
is the very process mandated by Section 1106. The fact that appellant had the right to file
an appeal to the Board under the express provisions of the Manual, establishes that he
was covered by Section 1106. Obviously, the City would not have allowed him to pursue
his appeal to the Board if it did not believe he had the right to do so, both in accordance
with the Manual, and pursuant to Section 1106.
When one considers the aforementioned allegations in appellant's Complaint and
the cited definitions and policies from the Manual and then cross-references them with
those persons who are identified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 as being exempt from
the hearing process and appeal rights mandated by Section 1106, it is obvious that
appellant was covered by Section 1106. Among other categories of employees who are
not relevant to this case, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2) expressly excludes the
following employees from the hearing protections provided in Section 1106:

76

(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body
exercising executive power in the municipality;

(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2).10 This statutory scheme is entirely consistent with the
City's policies, as set forth in the Manual, and which provide that top "Executive
Management Employees," who serve at the pleasure of the City Manager, do not have
appeal rights to the Board, but which also provide that "Management Employees," like
appellant, do have those rights. (R. at 39, 59, and 140-41). Finally, there is no evidence
to support appellant's conclusory assertion that he is possibly the "deputy of the head of a
department." Indeed, while the Manual defines a Department Director as "[t]he
individual designated as the administrative head of a department and designated as the
Department Director for that department," it does not contain anywhere a definition for a
"deputy of the head of a municipal department." (R. 57-61). Obviously, if such a
position existed at the City, there would have been a definition for this position among
the other 52 terms that are defined within the Manual. Accordingly, based on the record,
appellant was not exempt from the appeals process as outlined in Section 1106, because

10

Of course, most of the employees identified in this statute as being excluded from the
protections of Section 1106 are at-will employees who do not have a property interest in
their public employment, such as top executive employees who are appointed by the
municipality's executive authority (mayor or city manager, as the case may be),
probationary, part-time or seasonal employees, or they are public safety employees who
typically have their own due process protections by means of a Civil Service Commission
or other municipal provisions that provide the appropriate constitutional protections.
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the record unequivocally establishes that he was not the "head of a department" or a
"deputy of the head of a municipal department." Thus, the district court's dismissal of
appellant's Complaint for lack of jurisdiction should be affirmed.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT APPELLANT'S
FAILURE TO EXAUST HIS ADMISTRATIVE REMEDIES MANDATED
DISMISSAL OF HIS CASE.
The district court correctly held that, because appellant was subject to

Sectionl 106(6), which mandated that appellant's sole right of appeal of the Board's
decision was to this Court, appellant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies
precluded him from seeking judicial review of his case in the district court. (R. at 34344). Utah appellate courts have frequently found lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
exactly this situation. "Instances where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction include .
.. when a state court is asked to adjudicate a matter of administrative law when the
parties have not exhausted their administrative remedies . . . . In these instances, the
court cannot adjudicate the case because it has not been given the authority to do so."
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, f 9, 234 P.3d 1100.
The principle of exhaustion of remedies was recently applied in the context of a
workers compensation case in Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, f 30, 222
P.3d55:
The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement mandates that the
litigant follow all of the outlined administrative review procedures prior to
a state court having subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Satisfaction
of the exhaustion requirement does not depend upon the issues a litigant has
raised below but rather the administrative remedies the litigant has pursued.
There are times when a reviewing court may exercise its discretion in
addressing an unpreserved issue, but a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to
review an unexhausted case.
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Id. Similarly, the Utah federal district court has invoked a long standing United States
Supreme Court ruling on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. "The
exhaustion doctrine is 'the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.' Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303
U.S. 41, 50-51, 82 L. Ed. 638, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938)." Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v.
American Oil Co., 628 F.Supp. 363, 377-378 (D. Utah 1985).
"'Exhaustion of administrative remedies is the concept that administrative
agencies should complete [their] procedures before the courts interfere.' Id. NPEA
enforcement is 'a process which has been committed to the agency by the legislature and
it should be allowed to run its course'; the exhaustion doctrine 'prevents confusion that
may arise if a party seeks relief in two forums; and requires parties to address their
grievances without going to court.'" MacArthur v. San Juan County, 391 F. Supp. 895,
980 (D.Utah2005).
Here, Utah statute mandates appeal rights for terminated public employees like
appellant to an appeals board. In response to this statutory mandate, the City established
the Board. Applicable case law clearly requires appellant to exhaust administrative
remedies before proceeding to court. This Court has recently held as follows regarding
an appellant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under Section 1106:
We agree with the district court, which stated that '[i]n enacting Utah Code
[section] 10-3-1106, the Legislature deliberately granted jurisdictional
authority to review decisions of municipal boards of appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals." Additionally, Thorpe has failed to present any statute or
case law indicating that review of the decisions of municipal appeal boards
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may initially be pursued in any court other than this one. Cf. Utah Const.
Art. VIII, § 5 ('the district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute.'). Therefore, where the gravamen of the complaint is
termination of public employment by a merit employee, any judicial review
must be sought in the court of appeals.
Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, f 25, 668 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (citations
omitted).
Thus, pursuant to Section 1106, Utah established an administrative procedure for
employee termination cases to be reviewed and determined prior to invoking the judicial
system. This was not intended to be discretionary and an employee cannot bypass this
procedure. "The purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special
competence - to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors
so as to moot judicial controversies." Western Water, LLC, v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, |18,
184 P.3d 578. As set forth in the prior Section of this brief, Section 1106 clearly applies
to appellant. Thus, because appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by
initially seeking review of the Board's decision with this Court, the district court was
correct in dismissing appellant's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
D.

THE MANUAL'S EXPRESS DISCLAIMER OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS PRECLUDES AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.
Appellant's argument regarding the Manual's disclaimer hinges on a distinction

between "an implied contract requiring 'good cause' for termination" and an implied
contract that "internal policies and procedures" will be applied in disciplinary matters.
See Appellant's Brief at 16. Appellant asserts an implied contract of the later variety and
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claims the City did not follow its own internal policies. Id. at 19-22. The distinction is a
very subtle one at best. To breathe life into the distinction, appellant relies heavily upon,
and discusses at considerable length, the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), and argues that there may be
situations where internal policies overcome an express disclaimer that an employment
situation is at will. Id. at 16-17 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694,
33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). Appellant's argument is unavailing and it is worth noting that
concurring opinion in Johnson dealt with the issue of at-will private employees, whereas
this cases involves a merit, public employee who is not at-will, but who has a
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment, as well as appeal rights
mandated by the state statute and the City's own policies.
In any event, this issue has been considered at length by the Utah State Supreme
Court, whose rulings can be consulted without recourse to concurring opinions. Before
reviewing these authorities, it is, of course, black letter law that appellant has the burden
of proving the existence of an implied contract. See Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384,
1386 (Utah 1977). Appellant rightly quotes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol Inc., wherein the Court held that the existence of an implied
contract "turns on the objective manifestations of the parties," 818 P.2d at 1001 (Utah
1991). See Appellant's Brief at 15. The holding of the case, however, stands for the
proposition that an express declaration against contractual liability can be a controlling,
objective manifestation of that intent. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003-04. Within the
context of private, at-will employment, the Court does leave open the possibility that
31

policies and procedures may create alternative obligations. Id. at 1003. The parameters
of such additional contractual obligations are defined by the Supreme Court, however, in
the case of Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, 232 P.3d 486, which, like this case,
involved a merit, public employee. In Cabaness, the employee's surviving claims were
that an abusive supervisor's conduct towards the employee constituted a breach of an
implied contract based on provisions of an employment manual, and gave rise to a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ^fl. The manual in question
contained a disclaimer to the effect that "no contract exists between Bountiful City and its
employees with respect to salary, salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or
employee benefits." Id. at ^4. The Supreme Court held that the disclaimer was limited in
its scope and did not cover implied contractual obligations that arose out of policies in the
manual regarding workplace abuse. Id. at ^[37. In Cabaness, Bountiful City had argued
that, if the court found that a policy prohibiting certain workplace conduct, which
Bountiful City argued was a warning to employees not to engage in such conduct, created
a contractual obligation to prevent such conduct from occurring, it would wreak havoc on
employers and expose them to unforeseen liability. The Utah Supreme Court, however,
responded to this argument by referring to the importance of disclaimers of contractual
obligations in manuals and stated "[i]f anything, our decision today may cause employers
wishing to avoid contractual liability to draft their employee manuals with clear and
conspicuous disclaimer language." Id. at n. 9.
Accordingly, under Cabaness, a disclaimer prevents a finding of implied
contractual obligations where the disclaimer is clear and conspicuous. In other words, it
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covers "the relevant provisions of the Employee Manual." Id. at 137. In the present
case, the express disclaimer appears at the very beginning of the section on human
resources, the section containing the policies and procedures for disciplinary action on
which appellant relies. What is more, the disclaimer clearly addresses the policies and
procedures on which appellant relies in stating that the "policies and procedures
presented herein provide for the fair and orderly administration of the personnel system
of the City of Orem" and then disclaims any contractual liability arising from those very
policies. (R. at 61). Applying the holdings of Johnson and Cabaness to this case, the
disclaimer here clearly and conspicuously disclaims any contractual liability based on the
very disciplinary policies and procedures on which appellant attempts to rely. Therefore,
an objective manifestation of intent to be contractually bound is precluded, and the
district court's decision on this point should be affirmed.
E.

REGARDLESS, EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE MANUAL
DOES GIVE RISE TO AN IMPLIED CONTRACT, THE RECORD
ESTABLISHES THAT THE CITY COMPLIED WITH ITS POLICIES.
Regardless, even if the Court concludes that the disclaimer somehow does not

cover the disciplinary policies and procedures in the Manual, the facts in the record
establish that the City complied with its policies and procedures when it terminated
appellant's employment. Appellant argues that the City violated its internal policies and
procedures with respect to his termination because the Manual provides that,
"Disciplinary actions shall be limited in severity commensurate with the infraction(s) in
question and/or past infractions." Appellant's Brief at 4-5 (emphasis added). Appellant
then notes the distinction between informal and formal disciplinary actions, asserting that

prior to the Notice appellant had "never been subject to any disciplinary notice or
proceedings" and that "the City took no efforts to correct any errors or address any
performance concerns through 'informal' action or discipline." Id. This entire argument,
however, has no merit based on the Board's Findings and Conclusions, which are binding
on appellant for the reasons discussed previously in this brief. Specifically, the Board
made numerous, specific factual findings regarding appellant's job deficiencies, his
neglect of duty, the major errors he engaged in which "harmed" the City and its
employees, as well as his "serious violation of City policy" and then concluded that his
"immediate termination was warranted." (R. at 230-34). Moreover, the City was under
no obligation to provide informal actions pursuant to the express provisions of the
Manual, which state, "[i]t shall be the City's discretion as to which type of informal
and/or formal disciplinary actions is most appropriate." (R. at 44).
Appellant also asserts that the Notice was the first time he was made aware of the
problems surrounding his employment. See Appellant's Brief at 4-5. This assertion is
simply unsupported based on the Board's binding conclusion and finding that appellant
was on "constructive notice" due to the constant efforts of his colleagues to bring
appellant's errors to his attention. (R. at 230-34). Even assuming this assertion to be
true, however, the Manual expressly provides that "[n]othing contained in these Policies
and Procedures shall preclude dismissal with or without pay effective immediately
without prior notice and a hearing where the continued presence of the employee would
present a hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City." (R. at 43). The
Board's finding that appellant's conduct harmed the City and its employees clearly
1A

satisfies a policy that an employee can be immediately terminated without prior notice if
he "presents a hazard or disruption to employees . . . or the City." Id. In addition, the
Board's findings regarding appellant's many, egregious mistakes, the effect of which
included the risk of the City losing its Bond rating, and the fact that it took the City a
week to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars that appellant mistakenly wired to a
third-party, supported the Board's conclusion that appellant's "performance constitutes a
serious violation of City policy in terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty,
conduct causing discredit to the City and failure to meet expected performance levels
such that immediate termination was warranted." (R. at 231).
Therefore, based on this record, appellant has no claim that the City failed to
follow its own policies and procedures with respect to his termination.
F.

BASED ON HIS FAILURE TO ADDRESS HIS REMAINING CLAIMS IN
HIS BRIEF, APPELLANT HAS ABANDONED THESE CLAIMS AND THE
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THEM IS DISPOSITIVE.
On appeal, appellant has apparently abandoned his remaining claims for

defamation, slander and libel, tortious interference with current and prospective economic
relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment and respondeat superior, based on appellant's failure to discuss or even
address them in his brief. An appellant's failure to address claims or issues in an opening
brief on appeal constitutes waiver of them on appeal. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1220 n. 17 (Utah 1993).
As noted above, while appellant did reference his defamation claim in his
Docketing Statement, he has failed to address it in his brief. Regardless, for the reasons

articulated in both appellees' supporting memoranda to their motion to dismiss (which
are incorporated herein by this reference), as well as the district court's decision, the
defamation claim should be dismissed for multiple reasons, as discussed therein.
Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of all of appellant's remaining claims should
be upheld.

VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, appellees respectfully submit that the district court's
decision to grant their motion dismiss should be affirmed and appellant's appeal should
be dismissed on the merits.
DATED this 18th day of January, 2011.
PRESTON & SCOTT

By*"
Stanley J.
Bryan M. $£ott
Stephen J. Preston
Attorneys for Appellees Orem City
and Jeffrey W. Pedersen
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THE CITY OF OREM EMPLOYEE APPEAL BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL BY

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

DARWIN KOCHERHANS
On December 11,200$, the City of Orem Employee Appeal Board (hereinafter *the
Board") heard Darwin Kocherhans? appeal contesting Bi$ termination by the City on September
24,2008. The Board was sitting pursuant to Orem City Code Article 2-26. The City was
represented by Stan Preston and Bryan Scott. Mr. Kocherhans was represented by Travis J.
Larsen, Jim Reams:presided at the hearing.
The hearing was conducted in an informal manner. Both parties called witnesses and
cross examined the otiier party's witnesses. The City introduced several exhibits into evidence
that were made part of the record. The Board also asked questions of die witnesses. Both parties
made closing statements* After talcing evidence and hearing argument from the parties, the
Board retired to deliberate and vote whether to uphold the Administrative Services Director's
("the Director") decision to terminate Mr. Kocherhans, After taking a secret ballot the Board
voted 9-0 to uphold the Director's decision.
The Board hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in support
of its decision:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The position of Treasury Division Manager ("Treasurer") is one that requires a

high level of competence and attention to detail as the position involves, among other things,
handling public funds and preparing portions of the City budget. Additionally, the position

1

requires excellent interpersonal skills as the Treasurer must interact on a daily basis with other
City employees and people in the financial services industry outside the City.
2>

Mistakes made by the Treasurer can have financial consequences for the City, its

residsntSj and employees, As well, mistakes made by the Treasurer can have a negative impact
on the City's reputation and credit rating with its vendors and financial institutions with which it
transacts business.
3.

Mr. Kocherhans held the position of City Treasurer for approximately two and

one-half years prior to being terminated from employment As part of his job he interacted with
various employees within the City as well as vendors and financial institutions outside the City.
4.

Mr, Kocherhans transmitted incoirect payroll information to the bank for the pay

period ending September 6, 2008. Mr. Kocherhans had several opportunities to avoid the
problem initially and then correct it once the wheels have been placed in motion. Mr.
Kocherhans should have noticed the payroll submission was for the wrong pay period. Then Mr.
Kocherhans ignored the warnings by the bank that the submitted payroll figure was identical to
the previous pay period. Having .two identical payroll amounts back-to-back is virtually
impossible. Despite the bank's warning Mr. Kocherhans failed to do any follow-up
investigation.
5.

As a result of Mr, Kocherhans' error, the City and its employees were harmed.

Numerous employees were underpaid while five were overpaid. Those who were underpaid
could have faced distress by bouncing check and incurring associated costs, Timely intervention
by other City and bank employees averted a crisis, This error caused significant problems for a
number of City employees and bank personnel who had to correct the error.
expended several hours of time correcting the mistake.

2

City employees

6.

Mr, KocheThans transmitted a wire transfer to a bond trust fond on September 9,

2008 for $586398.80, The correct amoral should have been $58,398.80. The City had to ask
the trustee to return the extra funds. It took a lead one week to get the money back. Mr,
Kocherhans should have noticed his ezror prior to sending the funds.
7.

Similarly, on September 11, 2008, Mr. Kocherhans sent a wire transfer for

$796,930.61 instead of the correct amount of $76,930.61.
8.

The two wire transfer mistakes are part of a .larger pattern of inattention to detail,

9.

Mr. Kocherhana repeatedly wired the wrong amount for Roth IRAs to the

Hartford despite being reminded by members of the accounting department. The City had to
send letter to the Hartford acknowledging the mistake and requesting a refund.
10.

Mr. Kocherhans incorrectly entered the new water bill base rate in July, 2008,

necessitated issuing a refund to residential water users the following month.
11.

Mr. Kocherhans made a bond payment on April 2, 2008, that was two months late

thereby exposing the City to a downgrading of its bond rating. Additionally, the City was
charged £7000.00 in .late charges but the charges were later waived.
12.

Mr. Kocherhans failed to respond to voicemails and emails in a timely fashion

and he often failed to attend scheduled meetings with other employees. This undermined his
position as well as made it difficult for other City employees to do their jobs. Examples were
received by the board as Exhibit 3.
13.

Mr. .Kocherhans does not have the support aad confidence of his co-workers and

supervisor. They expressed that he i$ not competent to fulfill the duties required of the City
Treasurer. The City Treasurer must have that support to effectively carry out his duties,

3

14,

Mr. Kocherhanss was on constructive notice that his job performance was deficient

due to his fellow employees numerous attempts to brmg his shortcomings to his attention.
14.

Based on the testimony of witnesses and the exhibits received into evidence, the

Board concludes Mr. Kocherhans has exhibited a lackadaisical attitude toward his duties as
Treasurer aad lacks the necessary skill set to perform effectively in his role as City Treasurer.
The Board finds he was trained in the day-to-day tasks of the Treasurer's position but failed to
perform his job with the standard of care required in such a sensitive position
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Board has jurisdiction to hear Mr, Kocherhans' appeal pursuant to Orem City

Code 2-26-2.
2.

The witnesses for the City were credible.

3.

The Director's decision to terminate Mr. Kocherhans was neither arbitray and

capricious nor otherwise illegal.
4.

The Board concludes there was substantial evidence as defined in Orem City

Coda 2-26-12 to support the Director's decision.
5.

Mr. Kocherhans' job performance constitutes a serious violation of City policy in

terms of incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty> conduct causing discredit to the City and
failure to meet expected performance levels such that immediate termination was warranted.
ORDER
By a 9-0 vote of the Board, the Director's decision to terminate Mr. Kocherhans*
employment with the City is upheld,
/////
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lis fL-* day of December, 2008.
Dated this

iraj&eanis
airman of the Employee Appeals Board
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on. the _

A

day
day of December, 2008,1 sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to:
Travis J. Larsen
Ascians, Heideman & McKay
2696 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
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DISTRIC COURT MEMORANDUM DECISION
JUDGE CHRISTINE S. JOHSNON
4-21-10
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARWIN KOCHERHANS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 090102287

Plaintiff,

Date: April 21, 2010

vs.

Judge Christine S. Johnson

CITY OF OREM, et. al.,
Defendants.

1.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed with a
Memorandum in Support on September 11, 2009. Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in
Response on October 8, 2009. Defendants' Reply was received by the Court on October
29, 2009. A Request to Submit for Decision was filed the following day, and the matter
scheduled for oral arguments as per the Plaintiffs request. Oral arguments were
presented on March 30, 2010. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Justin D. Heideman.
Defendants were represented by Mr. Stanley J. Preston and Mr. Bryan M. Scott. Having
read the pleadings submitted and considered the oral arguments presented, and being
advised of the applicable law, the Court now enters the following:
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BACKGROUND
2.

Plaintiff (hereinafter Kocherhans) was an employee of Orem City (hereinafter City) and
supervised by Pedersen (collectively Defendants). After working for City for a period of
approximately twenty-eight years, Kocherhans was promoted to the position of City
Treasurer. It is agreed by the parties that he was defined as an c*exempt" employee. For
the duration of his employment, Kocherhans had received favorable reviews. Following
his promotion, however, several performance problems were documented by Pedersen,
including a payroll error which impacted both City and bank personnel, and mistakes in
wire transfers amounting to approximately 1.2 million dollars.

3.

On September 15, 2008, Kocherhans received a Notice of Intent to Terminate (hereinafter
Notice) from his supervisor, Pederson. The Notice, which made Kocherhans' termination
effective on Sepember 18, 2008, detailed the issues described, supra, as well as other
lesser grievances. Kocherhans thereafter followed the administrative procedures outlined
in the Orem Employee Handbook (hereinafter Manual) and appealed his termination.
The Notice was made part of Kocherhans5 employee records and communicated to the
Appeal Board as part of the appeal process.

4.

The appeal entity denied Kocherhans' appeal, upholding Pedersen's decision to terminate
his employment. Kocherhans brought the present action on August 10, 2009, alleging
multiple causes of action, including wrongful termination, tortious interference,
defamantion, slander, and libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment, and respondeat superior.
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ARGUMENTS PRESENTED
5.

Kocherhans contends that the Manual acted as an implied contract which the City
breached by terminating his employment. Defendants respond with descending
arguments: First, that res judicata bars the present action, as Kocherhans was afforded his
due process through the City's appeal process, and Kocherhans failed to exhaust his
administrative remedy by appealing the decision of the Appeal Board to the Utah Court of
Appeals. Second, even if res judicata does not apply, the Manual does not act as an
implied contract. Third, if an implied contract did exist, Defendants did not breach it.
Fourth, Kocherhans wrongful termination claim is barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah.

6.

Kocherhans next contends that Defendants have interfered with both his current and
future economic relations. He asserts that his wrongful termination, and the specific
claims charged against him in the Notice have made it impossible for him to secure
employment following his dismissal. This claim should survive dismissal "[a]s there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the means by which Defendants' dismissed
Plaintiff were proper[.]" Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p.
16. Defendants respond that this claim hinges on the viability of the contract claim and
must fail for the reasons described supra.

7.

Next, Kocherhans asserts that the Notice communicated to the Appeal Board constitutes
defamation, slander, and libel whereas his reputation and ability to obtain future
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employment have been damaged. Defendants respond that this complaint is barred as the
statements in the Notice were true, and because they are protected by privilege.
8.

Kocherhans next claim alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, as the content
of the Notice was outrageous, intolerable, and extreme. Defendants reply that this claim
is similarly barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, the content of the
note does not rise to the level of outrageous and extreme conduct required.

9.

Finally, Kocherhans pleads the complaint of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. This
claim addresses accrued administrative leave for which Plaintiff asserts he received no
compensation. Defendants maintain that under the terms of the Manual Kocherhans was
an exempt employee and was not permitted to accrue administrative leave. Accordingly,
no compensation is due.
ANALYSIS

10.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. UT. R. Civ. PRO. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss
may also be brought for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." UT. R. Civ. PRO.
12(b)(1). When reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, the Court is required to accept as true the
factual allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895
(Utah 2001).
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Res Judicata and Administrative Remedies
11.

The requirements for applying the doctrine of res judicata are:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been completely,
fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Murdoch v. Springville Man Corp, 1999 UT 39, f 18, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999).

12.

Defendants assert that this doctrine applies here, as Kocherhans availed himself of an
administrative hearing which addressed the identical issues presented here. There is no
dispute between the parties that Kocherhans appealed his dismissal to the Appeal Board
pursuant to the City's grievance procedures outlined in the Manual. Similarly, there is no
dispute that the Appeal Board upheld Kocherhans' termination. What is in dispute is
whether Kocherhans was a division manager within the meaning of Utah's Municipal
Code. The law provides some protection from job loss to municipal employees, declaring
that they are "subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in Section
10-3-1106." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1105(1).

13.

Section 10-3-1106 proceeds to require that any discharged municipal employee may
appeal that decision. It further requires that "[i]f the municipality provides an internal
grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's rights under that
grievance procedure before appealing to the board." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106(2)(b).
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14.

Notwithstanding, a municipal employee's right to a hearing and appeal do not apply to
certain positions, and those exceptions are outlined in Section 10-3-1105(2). Among
those are the positions of "a head of a municipal department" and "a deputy head of a
municipal department." Utah Code Ann. §10-1-1105(b)(g)-(h).

15.

Kocherhans contends that these exceptions applied to him in what he terms in the
Complaint as his position of "Treasury Division Manager." He argues that he was either
a head of a department or the deputy head of a department and was therefore not entitled
to an administrative appeal under the statute. He maintains that he sought that remedy
only as a precautionary measure and is therefore not precluded from seeking a remedy at
law.

16.

This is an issue which is appropriate for consideration at this stage, as there truly are no
issues of fact. The only issue is the legal interpretation of the City's Manual, and whether
that Manual defines Kocherhans as a head of a department.

17.

Turning to the Manual, the definition of terms defines a "Department Director" as "[t]he
individual designated as the administrative head of a department and designated as the
Department Director for that Department." See Manual at p. 115. Synonymous to the
Department Directors are the Executive Management Employees, who are "Department
Directors and serve at the pleasure of the City Manager. These employees constitute the
executive staff of the City and do not receive the grievance and appecds rights provided in
these policies and procedures." See Manual at p. 116 (emphasis added). In contrast,
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Management Employees are defined as "Employees of the City who are filling
management positions as determined by the City Manager." Id.
18.

In keeping with these definitions, the Manual separately designates which employees are
"exempt" and "non-exempt" for purposes of the FLSA. "Exempt" positions are
specifically named, including Pedersen's, whose title is listed as "Administrative Services
Director." This position is justified as being exempt because it is "Executive." Most
other "executive" positions similarly include the term "director" in their title, including:
Development Services Director, Library Director, Public Safety Director, Public Works
Director, and Recreation Director. The only three remaining executive positions include
Assistant City Manager, City Attorney, and City Manager. See Manual at pp. 34-35.
Kocherhans' title, Treasury Division Manager, is justified as an exempt position not
because it is executive, but as it is "Management." Id. at p. 35.

19.

In reading these provisions of the Manual together, it is clear that Kocherhans is not a
director. Nowhere in his job title is that term used, nor does the manual ever employ the
terms "Department Director" or "Executive Management Employee" with reference to his
position. To the contrary. Kocherhans' job as titled as a "manager" and as such fits
neatly within what is defined as a "management employee." Furthermore, his position is
not classified as exempt because it is "executive" as the other directors. His position is
exempt because he is management. While, as a manager, he has supervisory authority
over other employees, he does not direct a department and is not precluded from the
grievance procedures outlined in the Manual.
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20.

Neither does it follow that he is a deputy head of a department. His job title does not
define him as being a deputy or an assistant. Contrast this to the position of "Assistant
City Manager." This job title is classified as "exempt" because it "executive." This
position could be argued as a "deputy head of a municipal department" within the
meaning of the Municipal Code. However, there is simply nothing in the Manual to
support an argument that Kocherhans was either a director or deputy director and
exempted from the grievance process.

21.

Accordingly, the Appeal Board had subject matter jurisdiction over Kocherhans5 claim
and it is appropriate to apply the principles of res judicata here. Applying the four prongs
of res judicata, this Court finds that Kocherhans' wrongful termination claim is barred.
First, Kocherhans was a party to the prior, administrative adjudication; second, the claim
of wrongful termination was identical to the claim presented in the instant action; third,
that issue in was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and fourth, the administrative
hearing resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

22.

Furthermore, whereas the administrative remedy outlined both in the Municipal Code and
the Manual was applicable to Kocherhans, Defendants correctly point out that
Kocherhans has failed to exhaust his administrative remedy.

23.

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that a plaintiff waives his right to judicial
review by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies because "as a general rule,
parties must exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review
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of agency action." McBride v. Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT App 281 (quoting Nebeker v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, \ 14, 34 P.3d 180.
24.

The Municipal Code provides that: "A final action or order of the appeal board may be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. Each
petition . .. shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or order of
the appeal board." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106(6).

25.

It is without dispute here that Kocherhans did not appeal the decision of the Board to the
Court of Appeals, as required by statute. Hence, he has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and he is precluded from seeking judicial review here.

26.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint is
granted.

Implied Contract
27.

The Court will also briefly address the alternative grounds for dismissal, as those have
been fully briefed and argued.

28.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously considered the issue of whether an employee
manual can be read as an implied contract. In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997
(Utah 1991), the Court determined that, under certain circumstances, a contract could be
so construed. "The existence of such an agreement is a question of fact which turns on
the objective manifestations of the parties' intent." Id. at 1001.

29.

However, the facts of the Johnson case did not lend themselves to finding the existence of
an implied contract. The employee manual there stated:
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This book is provided for guidance only. The policies and procedures expressed
in this book, as well as those in any other personnel materials which may be issued
from time to time, do not create a binding contract or any other obligation or liability
on the company. Your employment is for no set period and may be terminated
without notice and at will at any time by you or the company. The company reserves
the right to change these policies and procedures at any time and for any reason.
Id. at 1003.
30.

The Court determined that this constituted "clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any
contractual liability and stating Thiokol's intent to maintain an at-will relationship with its
employees[.]" Id. Accordingly, there was no implied contract as a matter of law, and the trial
court's dismissal of the contract claim at summary judgment was proper. Id. at 1004.

31.

This issue was recently revisited in Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 2. Cabaness examined
the issue of implied contracts in the context of Bountiful City's employee manual. The
Bountiful City Employee Manual contained a disclaimer stating that "no contract exists
between Bountiful City and its employees with respect to salary, salary ranges, movement
within salary ranges, or employee benefits." Id. at f4.

32.

The contractual claim made by the plaintiff in Cabaness, however, did not deal with salary,
salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or employee benefits. Instead, the former
employee challenged the city's failure to enforce its policies and procedures regarding
workplace harassment. "[T]he plain meaning of the disclaimer in this case is that Bountiful
Power intended to create a contract with its employees with respect to the items in the
Employee Manual that are not specifically listed in the disclaimer." Id. at ^[58.

33.

The limited language of the disclaimer, together with the manual's detailed provisions
regarding workplace harassment, "evince Bountiful Power's intent to voluntarily undertake
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additional duties to protect its employees from misconduct by supervisors or other
employees." Id. at ^[60. Accordingly, the Court held that "as a matter of law... the relevant
provisions of the Employee Manual create an implied contract between Bountiful Power and
Cabaness." Id.
34.

The Court elaborated that the Cabaness decision offers clarity in this area of the law, as it
provides clear direction to "employers wishing to avoid contractual liability to draft their
employee manuals with clear and conspicuous disclaimer language." Id. at ^[60 n. 9.

35.

In the present case, Kocherhans included the Orem City Employee Manual, attaching it as
Exhibit 4 to his complaint. The manual is divided into several sections: Section 1-General
Policies; Section 2-Risk Management Policies; Section 3-Human Resource Policies; and
Section 4-Compensation Policies.

36.

The opening paragraph in Section 3 reads as follows:
This Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual has been prepared to
assist employees in clearly understanding the personnel practices of the City.
The policies and procedures presented herein provide for the fair and orderly
administration of the personnel system for the City of Orem. Nothing in this
manual implies or is part of an employment contract.

37.

No disclaimer is evident in other sections of the manual. Whereas the plain language of this
disclaimer limits its application to the "Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual"
it is appropriate to interpret this disclaimer as applying to Section 3 only. Adopting the
holding of Johnson and Cabaness, this provision of the manual constitutes clear and
conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability as to human resources policy.
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Accordingly, there was no implied contract as a matter of law as to the provisions covered
by the Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual.
3 8.

The Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual outlines City5 s process in conducting
performance evaluations, grievances, and disciplinary action.

It includes the City's

procedure in termination and the appeal process which may follow. Whereas it is this
process which forms the basis of Kocherhan's wrongful termination claim, there is no
implied contract. Kocherhans concedes that, if there is no implied contract, this claim must
fail.
39.

Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Wrongful Termination
claim is granted.

Defamation
40.

Defamation is defined as a communication which "tends to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§559,563. "A prima facie case for
defamation must demonstrate that '(1) the defendant published the statements [in print or
orally]; (2) the statements were false; (3) the statements were not subject to privilege; (4) the
statements were published with the requisite degree of fault; and (5) the statements resulted
in damages.'" Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ^21 (quoting Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008
UT 70, \ 68, 194 P.3d 956) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

41.

Defamation in the context of employee termination has been considered by the Court of
Appeals mAlfordv. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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InAlford, the plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the League of Cities and
Towns. She thereafter appealed her termination and requested that her former employer
provide to the Appeal Board a report detailing the reasons for her dismissal. The contents
of this report later formed the basis of the defamation claim. Id. at 203. Her claim was
dismissed on summary judgment, and she thereafter appealed.
42.

In consideration of her appeal, the court first observed that "[communications between
persons who share a common interest are qualifiedly privileged and not libelous in the
absence of malice." Id. at 204.l Because there was a common interest shared by the Board
and the League to determine the factual circumstances surrounding the plaintiffs
termination, the qualified privilege applied, and "in order to circumvent this qualified
privilege of common interest, [the plaintiff] must show that these allegedly defamatory
employee statements were published maliciously." Id. at 205.

43.

The court went on to conclude that there was no malice. "[T]he communications between
the League and the Board shared the common interest of the investigation of the reasons for
Alford's termination and the communications were not maliciously published since they were
provided to the Board at the request of Alford to allow the Board to consider her appeal.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the summary judgment granted by the trial court." Id.
at 206.

!

See also Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983) ("[I]t has long been held that
communications between persons who share a common business interest are qualifiedly
privileged and not libelous in the absence of malice.")
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44.

This Court sees no distinction between the facts of Alford and the present case. The
statements contained in the Notice are privileged and cannot form the basis of a defamation
or libel claim, absent a showing of malice. Where the Notice at issue was provided to the
Appeal Board at the request of Kocherhans to allow consideration of his appeal, there can
be no malice.

45.

Furthermore, the outcome of the prior administrative hearing upheld Kocherhans'
termination and thereby established that the contents of the Notice were true. As noted by
Defendants, res judicata acts to bar this claim.

46.

Based upon the foregoing, Kocherhans has failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted and the Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

Tortious Interference with Economic Relations
47.

The tort of interference with economic relations exists when " ( ! ) • • • the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for
an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injuryf.]" Leigh Furniture and
Carpet Co v Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).

48.

The improper purpose or means alleged is generally the dismissal of Kocherhans, and more
specifically, the Notice which Kocherhans claims was defamatory. Whereas the Court has
determined that there is no wrongful termination or defemation, there can similarly be no
improper purpose or improper means.

49.

Hence, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim is granted.
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
50.

Utah law recognizes a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when
a defendant:
intentionally engage[s] in some conduct towardfs] the plaintiff, (a) with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature
as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
Fannen v Lehi City, 2005 UT App 301.

51.

"To be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more
than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair." Franco, 2001 UT 25, at ^28 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).

52.

In Sperber v Galligher Ash Co, 747 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court
considered the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of employee
termination and held that "mere discharge from employment does not constitute outrageous
or intolerable conduct" within the meaning of the law. Id at 1028.

53.

The present case is similar in that the allegations are limited to the statements regarding
Kocherhans in the Notice. There is no pattern of harassing, abusive, or intimidating conduct
for a jury to deliberate. There is a single interoffice memo which details the reasons
Kocherhans was terminated. Where termination has been specifically held to not give rise
to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, there is no genuine issue of material
fact for a jury to consider. Moreover, Plaintiff conceded in oral arguments that if this claim
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hinged on Kocherhans' claim of wrongful termination. Where the wrongful termination
claim has failed, then this claim must fail as well.
54.

Furthermore, Plaintiff s second difficulty arises with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
(hereinafter UGIA), which provides as follows: "Except as maybe otherwise provided in this
chapter, each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental entity are immune
from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function." Utah
Code Ann. §63G-7-201.

55.

Where there has been no waiver of immunity for intentional torts, Plaintiffs claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred.

56.

Based upon the foregoing, the Defendants5 motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

Quantum Meruit
57.

Kocherhans' final claim is for quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment. Quantum meruit "as
amount of recovery means as much as deserved, and measures recovery under implied
contract to pay compensation as reasonable value of services rendered." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

58.

1243 (6th ed. 1990).

Kocherhans asserts this claim against Defendants "for the recovery of the value of the
'administrative leave' Plaintiff had accrued, but which he was not compensated for upon
dismissal." Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at p. 21.

59.

Orem City's description of administrative leave is located in Section 1 of the Manual. As
noted supra, this section of the Manual contains no disclaimer language evincing the City's
intent to not create an implied contract. Making all reasonable inferences in favor of
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Kocherhans, the Court will infer that there is an implied contract with respect to the City's
administrative leave policy.
60.

The administrative leave policy is described as being applicable to exempt employees, such
as Kocherhans. The Manual summarizes an expectation that exempt employees may work
more than 40-hours per week in order to complete their assignments and responsibilities.
However, when such a situation arises, "the employee is eligible for administrative leave[.]"
Manual p. 31. The policy elaborates that "Administrative leave may be taken for up to 8
hours at a time." Id. Furthermore, "Administrative leave is not accriiable nor is it vacation
leave. It is not the intent of this policy that employees take an hour of administrative leave
for every hour worked over 40 hours." Id (emphasis added).

61.

Where the plain language of the contract at issue dictates that administrative leave is not
accruable, it is inapposite for Kocherhans to claim now that he is entitled to receive
compensation the value of accrued administrative leave.

62.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
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CONCLUSION
63.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Counsel for the Defendant is directed to
prepare the appropriate order
DATED this

O I

day of April, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

f ) /? A ><—!. r *
CEristine^Joknson
DISTRICT COURjf-JUDGE
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RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE OREM EMPLOYEE MANUAL

B. A quorum shall consist of any six (6) members of the Board,
provided that the City Manager (or his or her designee) is
present,
C. The minimum number of votes required to take any action .
shall be a majority of those present at the hearing, provided^
that the City Manager (or his or her designee) is present, and '
provided that there is quorum.
2-26-7.

Employees Eligible to Appeal to Board.
Only full-time, part-time and supplemental probationary
employees (as defined by City policy) shall have the right to
appeal to the Board. Probationary employees, flexible employees,
trainee employees, and executive management employees (as
defined by City policy) are not eligible to appeal to the Board.
j

2-26-8.

Issues that May be Appealed to Board.
Only the following types of employment actions against an eligible
employee may be appealed to the Board: (1) terminations; (2)
suspensions for more than two days without pay; or (3) involuntary
transfers from one position to another with less remuneration.

2-26-9.

Other Appeals.
This ordinance establishes specific employee appeal rights to x ..
comply with State law requirements. Nothing herein shall be
interpreted to restrict or eliminate other appeal rights that may be
available to City employees pursuant to City policy.

2-26-10.

Procedure for Appeals.
A. No employee may appeal to the Board unless the employee
timely complies with the City's applicable internal grievance
or disciplinary procedure and receives notice of a final [
disposition under [he applicable internal grievance or
disciplinary procedure.
B. An eligible employee desiring to appeal an eligible adverse
employment action to the Board must file written notice with
the City Recorder within tm (10) days after the date that the
employee receives notice of the final disposition under the
applicable internal grievance or disciplinary procedure. The '
employee's written notice of appeal must include:
1. The specific reasons for the appeal;
2. A copy of the Notice of Intent to Discipline; and
3. A copy of the Department Director's decision.
136
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4.

Except for oral reprimands, all disciplinary actions shall become a part of the
employee's personnel record.

5.

Nothing contained in these Policies and Procedures shall preclude dismissal or
suspension with or without pay effective immediately without prior notice anc^
a hearing where the continued presence of the employee would present a
hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City. When such
dismissal or suspension is imposed, the employee shall be assured rights of a
post disciplinary appeal in accordance with this procedure.

Informal Action
Informal action may be appropriate when a rule, order, procedure, standard of
conduct andy'or expected peiformancc level has been violated. Any one or a
combination of the following informal actions may be used as deemed appropriate
by the City:
A- Verbal Reprimand - The supervisors) should make it clear to the
employee that the violation is unacceptable and that any repetition may
lead to stronger disciplinary action;
B. Corrective Interviews - The supervisor(s) confers with the employee '
regarding violations and develops a written corrective plan whicfl,
includes target dates for the correction of violations by the employee.
This plan shall be reviewed with and signed by the employee with a copy
to be placed in the employee's personnel file;
C

Written Reprimand - The supervisor(s), in writing, indicates violations
and specific actions the employee is to take to correct any violations.
Warning should be provided that formal disciplinary action may result if
corrective action i<* not taken by the employee. Copies of written
reprimand shall be placed in the employee's personnel file.

These informal types of actions are intended to correct a problem without recourse
to the severity of formal disciplinary action.

Formal Disciplinary Action
Formal actions are usually taken only after a serious violation or after repetitions
of lesser violations where informal action has been unsuccessful in correcting
violations. Formal actions may include but are not limited to:
A. Suspension without pay for more than two days;
B. Reduction in salary;
132

STEP 4
Within ten (10) working days of receiving a written request for a hearing, the
Human Resources Division Manager shall convene the EAC and provide them
with all the information submitted.
The EAe shall set a hearing date and prepare written notification to both sides.
Unless precluded by unusual circumstances, die hearing shall be held within a
reasonable time, generally twenty (29) days from the date the EAC was notified of
the request At least five days notice shall be given to all affected parties,
STEPS
The EAC shall hear the specific request as outlined on the forms provided to the
Human Resources Division Manager in STEP 1 of this procedure for formal
grievances. The EAC shall only hear the specific matter and shall not consider any ]
other items.
STEP 6
Within five (5) working days of the completion of the hearing, the EAC shall
forward a written report to the City Manager for his consideration. This reoort!
shall contain the findings and recommendations of the EAC.
STEP 7
Within five (5) worMng days of receiving the report of the EAC, the City Manager
shall consider the EAC's findings and recommendations, and reach a final written
decision on the matter. The City Manager*s written decision shall be sent to all
affected parties and shall be final and binding.

Disciplinary Procedure
POLICY
1. All disciplinary actions short of termination are intended to be corrective and
obtain compliance with policies, orders, procedures, standards of conduct,
expected performance standards and/or improve performance.
2.

Disciplinary actions shall be limited in severity commensurate with the
infractions) in question and/or past infractions.

3.

It shall be tho. City's discretion as to which type of informal and/or formal
disciplinary action is most appropriate. Only full and part time and
supplemental probationary employees shall have the right to file an appeal to
disciplinary actions and then only to formal disciplinary actions. All appeals
shall be filed in accordance with the appeal provisions outlined in this i
procedure.
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Salary Rarge Increase - An increase in the salary range for a classification.
Severance~Pav~- Wages-paid-in-Iieu of allowing-an employee-to work upontermination for any reason,

(
Supplemental Probation - A return to probationary status of an employee who '\
performs below an acceptable level or Tor any of the Causes for Discipline or I
Dismissal listed in this handbook.
Suspension Disciplinary - Temporary separation of an employee, without pay, for
disciplinary reasons for a specified period of time.
Administrative - Temporary separation of an employee, with pay, for an
unspecified period of time to allow for investigation of matters pending I
concerning that employee.
Transfer - A change from one position to another in the same class, or comparable
class in die same or another department.
Work Shift - The days of the workweek or work period and the hours during that
week or period that an employee is assigned to work on a regular basis.
•»
Working Day - The same as a Business Day whether or not that day is a part of thd
employee's work shift, excludes weekends and holidays.

Personnel Records
The Human Resources Office shall maintain a confidential personnel record for
each employee of the City in accordance with any State of Federal regulations.
Information of a derogatory nature shall not be placed in the personnel record
unless the employee has been provided a signed copy thereof and has had an
opportunity to respond. Employees shall have the right to comment on any item in
their personnel record. Such comments shall be retained as part of the personnel
record.

Contents
Information maintained in each personnel record shall include:
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Performance Evaluation - Reports of job performance.
Personnel Record - The official file of the City for each employee kept in fee
Human Resources Office.
Probationary Period - An extension of the selection or promotion process during
which an employee is required to demonstrate satisfactory performance of the
duties, compatibility, good attitude, etc. for the position to which appointed.
Promotion - A change in employment status from one classification to a second
classification possessing higher minimum qualifications and which is assigned a
higher salary range in the City's Salary Plan.
Promotional Examination - A recruitment process limited to current employees.
Reclassification - Modification of job title and duties with a corresponding salary.
range change.
Red-Circle - Freezing the salary of an employee earning more than the salary plan
provides for the employee's classification and level of performance.
Reduction in Pav - A reduction m the amount of pay received as a result of
I
1 disciplinary action or City Council action.
Reinstatement - Re-employment of a former employee.
Rejection - The dismissal or demotion of an employee during a probationary
period.
Reprimand - An oral or written notification to an employee regarding violation of j
a rule, order, procedure, standard of conduct and/or expected performance standard
including corrective action necessary by the employee.
|
Resignation - Voluntary termination of city employment by an employee including
the abandonment of a posi tion.
|
Salary - The wages paid for services performed.
Salary Adjustment - An adjustment in an employee's salary.
Salary Plan - A city-wide plan which provides a system to reward employees for
their performance.
Salary Range - A range for each individual classification which reflects a
minimum, midpoint and maximum salary.
in

Full-Ttrne - A benefited employee regularly scheduled to work a full work
week of at least 40 hours, who has successfully completed the initial
probationary period.
Employee Advisory Council (EAQ - A council elected by employees that, among
other things, (i) provides advice and recommendations to the City Manager foif
appeals to certain grievances, disciplinary actions and dismissals, and (2) together
with the City Manager, forms the Employee Appeal Board.
Employee Appeal Board - A beard established by City ordinance thar consists of
the EAC and the City Manager. The Employee Appeal Board hears certain
appeals from specified City employees.
Executive Management Employees - Employees in classifications designated as
Executive Management who are Department Directors and serve at the pleasure of
the City Manager. These employees constitute the executive staff of the City and
do not receive the grievance and appeals rights provided in these policies and
procedures.
Exempt Employees - Employees in classifications that are designated as exempt in
the City's Fair Labor Standards Act Policy.
Grievance - An allegation of a violation, misinterpretation or noncompliance witrj
a city ordinance, resolution, rule, or written policy, procedure or regulation •»
affecting working conditions, salaries or benefits, Normally, issues concerning an
employee's performance evaluations, training opportunities, work schedules or
assignments and other department related issues are not considered grievances
unless they rise to the level described above. Those issues should be resolved
between the employee and his/her supervisor, Division Manager and/or
Department Director.
Layoff - Involuntary termination of employment without prejudice because of
organizational changes, abolition of positions, shortages of work and/or funds.
Management Employees - Employees of the City who are filling management
positions as determined by the City Manager.
Minimum Qualifications - The minimum qualifications deemed necessary for an
individual to acqune and maintain employment in any particular classification
with the City,
Out-Qf-Class Pay - The higher salary an employee receives for temporarily I
working in a classification having a higher salary range than the one to which that
employee was appointed.
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Class or Classification - A position or group of positions having qualifications,
duties and responsibilities sufScientiy similar so that the same title, duties and
requirements are applied.
Class Plan- All approved classes including the policy for maintaining the.plan..
Class Specification - Description of duties, responsibilities and minimum
qualificatioa requirements of the positions included in the class as determined by
the Human Resources Division Manager.
Classified Employees - All fall and part time employees of the City of Qrem
except those designated as Professional, Management or Executive Management.
Compensation - Salary and all benefits accruing to a classification.
Demotion - A change in employment status from one classification to a second
classification possessing lesser minimum qualifications which is assigned a lower
salary range in the City's approved salary plan.
Department Director - The individual designated as the administrative head of a
department and designated as the Department Director for that department.
Disciplinary Action - An action taken against an employee for any of the reasons
listed in this handbook.
Dismissal - Involuntary and complete separation from city employment for!
disciplinary reasons, rejection during a probationary period, or the inability to'
perform all of the essential functions of the job due to mental or physical
problems,
i
Employee Flexible - An employee receiving only an hourly rate of pay and those
benefits mandated by law.
i
Part-time - A benefit-eligible employee who has successfully completed the
initial probationary period and is regularly scheduled to work less than 40
hours per work week.
Trainee - An employee who occupies a full or part time position, does not
possess the minimum qualifications, and is compensated less than the
minimum salary for the position.
Probationary - A full or part time employee who has not completed the
initial probationary period and receives compensation as provided herein.
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SECTION 3 - HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES
L This HumanJResourcc Policies_and Procedures Manual lias_heen prepared to assist
emplo3/ees in clearly understanding the personnel practices of the City. The
policies and procedures presented herein provide for the fair and orderly'
administration of the personnel system for the City of Orem. Nothing in this
manual implies or is part of an employment contract.
I It is the City's policy not to discriminate against any employee because of race, J
i creed, color, religion, gender, age, national origin, physical and/or mental
disability.

Definition of Terms
Ail terms, phrases and words as used in these policies and procedures shall have j
the meanings as defined in this section or as defined by common usage.
Abandonment of Position - The failure to report to work for two or more
consecutive regular work shifts without notification by the employee and approval
of the City.
Anniversary Date - One calendar year from the date of the employee's date of hird(
with the City and each succeeding year thereafter.
t
Appeal - A request by an employee for consideration in matters relating Lo a
grievance and/or discipline as set forth in these policies and procedures.
Appointing Authority - The City Manager or individuals the City Manager has
authorized to make appointments.
Appointment - The selection of, acceptance by, and the understanding of any
conditions of employment by an individual for a position with the City.
Business Day - 8:00 a.m. lo 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday of each week, J
excopt holidays.
Calendar Day - Any day of the year.
City - The City of Orern.
Citv Council - The City Council of the City of Orern.
Citv Manager - The City Manager of the City of Orem.
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Development Services Director
Emergency Manager
Engineering Section Mgr.
Fire Battalion Chief
•Fire-MarshallHuman Resources Division Manager
Information Tech. Div. Mgr.
Information Tech. Sect Mgr.
Librarian
Library Director
Library Division Manager
Maintenance Division Manager
Neighborhood Org. Spec.
Parks Section Manager
Planner
Planning Division Manager
Police Lieutenant
Police Sergeant/Sr Comp Prog
Prosecutor
Public Safety Director
Public Safety Division Manager
Public Works Director
Recreation Director
Recreation Manager-Facilities
Recreation Manager-Programs
Risk Manager
Senior Engineer
Senior Prog/Analyst
Staff Engineer
Streets Section Manager
Transportation Opns Sect Eng,
Treasury Division Manager
Water Reclamation Section Mgr.
Water Resources Division Mgr.
Water Section Manager

Executive
Professional
Management
Management
Professional
Management
Management
Management
Professional
Executive
Management
Management
Administrative
Management
Professional
Management
Management
Professional
Professional.
Executive
Management
Executive
Executive
Management
Management
Administrative
Professional
Professional
Professional
Management
Professional
Management
Management
Management
Management

Flexible Employees Salary Plan
I POLICY
It is the policy of the City of Orem to provide a fair and equitable salary plan for
flexible employees within the appropriation and policies adopted by the City
Council.
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Building Inspector
Cemetery Sexton
Construction Engineer
-Custodian
Development Services Technician
Engineering Specialist
Executive Assistant
Fire Engineer
Facility Maintenance Technician
Fleet Mechanic
Horticultuiist/Drban Forester
Human Resource Specialist
Information Systems Engineer
Instrument Control Technician
Lead Dispatcher
Library Computer Network Admin
Maintenance Helper
Plans Examiner
Police Sergeant
Pre-Treatment Inspector
Public Safety Officer
Public Works Field Supervisor
Public Works Technician
Records Office Supervisor
Recreation Specialist
[ Senior Building Inspector
Storekeeper
J Traffic Signal Specialist
Victim Assistance Coordinator
All Flexible Positions
I EXEMPT
Accounting Division Manager
I Administrative Services Director
Assistant City Attorney
Assistant City Manager
; Building Safety Division Mgr
j City Attorney
I City Engineer
City Manager
City Recorder
City Surveyor
j Community/N'hoodSvcsMgr
! Computer Programmer/Analyst
Deputy City Attorney

Business License Specialist
Community Service Officer
Construction Technician
Deputy-CityJlecorder
Dispatcher
Evidence Custodian/Technician
Fire Captain
Fire Prevention Specialist
Fleet Maintenance Section Manager
GIS Planner
Housing Rehab Specialist
Human Resource Technician
Instrument Control Specialist
ITS Engineer
Lead Mechanic
Library System Analyst
?C Coordinator
Plant Operator
Pre-Treatment Coordinator
Private Development Engineer
Public Works Crew Leader
Public Works Program Specialist
Purchasing Agent
Recreation Program Coordinator
Secretary
Senior Plant Operator
Traffic Sign Specialist
Treasury Utility Technician
Water Resources Utility Technician

Justification
Management
Executive
Management
Executive
Management
Executive
Management
Executive
Administrative
Professional
Administrative
Professional
Management

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 10-3-1106

U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-H06

§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transferAppeals—Board—Procedure
Currentness
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended
without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or
heads of departments.
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or
involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason,
the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without
pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under
Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to
the board.
(3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal
with the municipal recorder within 10 days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance
procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an interna! grievance procedure, the
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder
shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and
fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the
discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to
the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in
Subsection (5)(a)(ii).

(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under
Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and
municipality both consent,
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall
receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged or suspended without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was
transferred to a position of less remuneration.
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals
by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for
the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority,
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number
of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an
appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each
municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a councilmayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.

